In Part 1, I discussed where an ex post facto challenge began with respect to sex offender registries in the U.S. I discussed the seminal case, Smith v. Doe, decided in 2003, in which the U.S. Supreme Court decided that for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause, Alaska’s sex offender registry was civil and not punishment.
Thirteen years after Smith, two federal appeals courts have applied its test to registration laws far broader than Alaska’s. They reached opposite results, and the one that governs Indiana went against registrants.
The Sixth Circuit: Michigan’s Registry is Punishment
In 2016, the Sixth Circuit held that Michigan’s registration law imposed punishment and could not apply retroactively. Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F. 3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016). The decision focused on residency exclusion zones, frequent in-person reporting, and internet disclosures. The State of Michigan argued that the ruling turned on lifetime registration without an individual risk assessment, exclusion zones, and in-person reporting. These are all features Indiana’s law shares.
The U.S. Supreme Court declined to review Snyder. So the decision stands in the Sixth Circuit.
The Seventh Circuit: Indiana’s Registry is Not Punishment
Five years later, the Seventh Circuit confronted Indiana’s offender registry law. In 2021, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, applied Smith to Indiana’s Sex and Violent Offender Registration Act and held that it is not punitive under the U.S. Constitution. Hope v. IDOC, 9 F. 4th 513 (7th Cir. 2021) (en banc).
The Seventh Circuit considered the same features the Sixth Circuit had considered, including residency restrictions, frequent in-person reporting, restricted freedom of movement, and the lack of any risk assessment. The Court concluded that Indiana’s law goes further than Alaska’s in some respects, but not far enough to warrant a different outcome.
Two points limit Hope’s reach. First, it binds federal courts in the Seventh Circuit but not Indiana’s appellate courts. Second, the plaintiffs in Hope conceded that Indiana intended the registry law to be civil in nature. Is that still the case?
In Part 3 of this series, I will discuss the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2026 decision in Ellingburg v. United States.