New Offender Registration Requirement for Failure to Register

A few years ago, the Indiana General Assembly amended the Indiana Sex and Violent Offender Registration Act (INSORA) to give trial courts the discretion to impose a new registration period if an individual was convicted of failure to register. See Ind. Code section 11-8-8-19(a). The D.O.C. currently believes it has the authority to decide whether to impose a new registration period where a person is convicted of failing to register. However, the statute confers no such authority to the D.O.C. Since registration itself is akin to punishment, and only trial courts impose punishment, the discretionary authority rests in the trial courts.

Indiana’s appellate courts have not yet confronted this issue but may soon, given the D.O.C.’s insistence that it alone decides who should begin a new registration period after failing to register.

Effective July 1, 2026, Indiana will add a new wrinkle to this issue. Under a new law, “a person who has been convicted of failure to register as a sex offender in any jurisdiction” will now be required to register as a sex or violent offender in Indiana. Ind. Code section 11-8-8-5(b)(3) (2026). The person will be required to register for the period required by the other jurisdiction (if the failure-to-register conviction was obtained in another jurisdiction), or by Indiana, whichever is longer. Ind. Code section 11-8-8-19(f) (2026).

Under the current law discussed at the beginning of this post, whether the person had to start a new registration period in Indiana would be determined by the trial court. But this creates new problems.

Consider the following scenario. The statute giving the trial court discretion to impose a new registration period after a person was convicted in Indiana for failure to register took effect on July 1, 2019. What if a person has a failure to register conviction that predated that statute? Can that person now be required to begin a new registration period in Indiana? Probably bot, because the person could argue that the statute cannot be applied retroactively under the Indiana Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause.

But the answer is not as clear is the failure-to-register conviction is from another jurisdiction. The answer would likely depend on when that person relocated to Indiana. For example, assume the person was convicted in another state of failure to register but moved to Indiana just after the law took effect. If there was a registration requirement imposed in the other state for the new conviction, the requirement would follow the person to Indiana.

But what if a new registration requirement was not imposed in the other jurisdiction? When the person moves to Indiana, his failure-to-register conviction now exposes him to a new registration requirement. But as explained earlier, the matter is discretionary for the sentencing court. But in our hypothetical scenario, the sentencing court is not in Indiana.

Presumably the D.O.C. should be required to petition a criminal sentencing court with jurisdiction over the person to decide whether, in its discretion, the person should have to begin a new registration period. But the more likely scenario is that the D.O.C. will inform the person of a new registration requirement, forcing the person to either comply or expend resources challenging the new requirement in court.